This paper considers the security of iterated block ciphers against the di erential cryptanalysis introduced by Biham and Shamir. Di erential cryptanalysis is a chosen-plaintext attack on secret-key block ciphers that are based on iterating a cryptographically weak function r times (e.g., the 16-round Data Encryption Standard (DES) ). It is shown that the success of such attacks on an r-round cipher depends on the existence of (r-1)-round di erentials that have high probabilities, where an i-round di erential is de ned as a couple ( ; ) such that a pair of distinct plaintexts with di erence can result in a pair of i-th round outputs that have di erence , for an appropriate notion of \di erence". The probabilities of such di erentials can be used to determine a lower bound on the complexity of a di erential cryptanalysis attack and to show when an r-round cipher is not vulnerable to such attacks. The concept of \Markov ciphers" is introduced for iterated ciphers because of its signi cance in di erential cryptanalysis. If an iterated cipher is Markov and its round subkeys are independent, then the sequence of di erences at each round output forms a Markov chain. It follows from a result of Biham and Shamir that DES is a Markov cipher. It is shown that, for the appropriate notion of \di erence", the Proposed Encryption Standard (PES) of Lai and Massey, which is an 8-round iterated cipher, is a Markov cipher, as are also the mini-version of PES with block length 8, 16 and 32 bits. It is shown that PES(8) and PES(16) are immune to di erential cryptanalysis after su ciently many rounds. A detailed cryptanalysis of the full-size PES is given and shows that the very plausibly most probable 7-round di erential has a probability about 2 ?58 . A di erential cryptanalysis attack of PES(64) based on this di erential is shown to require all 2 64 possible encryptions. This cryptanalysis of PES suggested a new design principle for Markov ciphers, viz., that their transition probability matrices should not be symmetric. A minor modi cation of PES, consistent with all the original design principles, is proposed that satis es this new design criterion. This modi ed cipher, called Improved PES (IPES), is described and shown to be highly resistant to di erential cryptanalysis.
Introduction
Many secret-key block ciphers are cryptosystems based on iterating a cryptographically weak function several times. Each iteration is called a round. The output of each round is a function of the output of the previous round and of a subkey derived from the full secret key by a keyschedule algorithm. Such a secret-key block cipher with r-iterations is called an r-round iterated cipher. For example, the well-known Data Encryption Standard (DES) is a 16-round iterated cipher.
Di erential cryptanalysis, introduced by Biham and Shamir in 1], is a chosen-plaintext attack to nd the secret key of an iterated ciphers. It analyzes the e ect of the \di erence" of a pair of plaintexts on the \di erence" of succeeding round outputs in an r-round iterated cipher. In Section 2, we describe di erential cryptanalysis of a general r-round iterated cipher in terms of (r-1)-round \di erentials" instead of in terms of the \i-round characteristics" used in 1]. The hypothesis of stochastic equivalence, which has been implicitly assumed in di erential cryptanalysis, is explicitly formulated in Section 2. It is pointed out that one of the two prerequisites for di erential cryptanalysis to succeed on an r-round cipher is the existence of an (r-1)-round di erential with high probability, and it is shown that a lower bound on the complexity of di erential cryptanalysis can be obtained from the maximum di erential probability.
In Section 3, Markov ciphers are de ned as iterated ciphers whose round functions satisfy the condition that the di erential probability is independent of the choice of one of the component plaintexts under an appropriate de nition of di erence. It is shown that, for a Markov cipher with independent subkeys, the sequence of round di erences forms a Markov chain. It follows from a result of Biham and Shamir 1] that DES is a Markov cipher. The study of di erential cryptanalysis for an r-round Markov cipher is reduced to the study of the transition probabilities created by its round function. In particular, Markov chain techniques can be used to show whether the cipher is secure against di erential cryptanalysis after su ciently many rounds. determined by the secret key and hence the attacker has no need to nd the actual secret key.
The cryptanalysis of PES shows that the symmetry of transition probability matrix of its Markov chain is responsible for the \undesirably large" probability of its most probable 7-round di erential. This suggests a new design principle for Markov ciphers, viz., that their transition probability matrices should not be symmetric. A minor modi cation of PES, called Improved PES (IPES), was suggested by this new design principle and is described in Section 5. It is shown that this modi cation substantially improves the security of PES without violating any of the earlier design principles used for PES.
Di erential Cryptanalysis of Iterated Ciphers
Throughout this paper, we consider the encryption of a pair of distinct plaintexts by an r-round iterated cipher as shown schematically in Fig.1 . In this gure, the round function Y = f(X; Z) is such that, for every round subkey Z, f( ; Z) establishes a one-to-one correspondence between the round input X and the round output Y . Let the \di erence" X between two plaintexts (or two ciphertexts) X and X be de ned as X = X X ?1 ;
where N denotes a speci ed group operation on the set of plaintexts (= set of ciphertexts) and X ?1 denotes the inverse of the element X in the group. The round function Y = f(X; Z) is said to be cryptographically weak if, given a few triples ( X; Y; Y ), it is feasible (in most cases) to determine the subkey Z.
From the pair of encryptions, one obtains the sequence of di erences Y (0), Y (1); :::, Y (r) where Y (0) = X and Y (0) = X denote the plaintext pair so that Y (0) = X] and where Y (i) and Y (i) for (0 < i < r) are the outputs of the i-th round, which are also the inputs to the (i+1)-th round. The subkey for the i-th round is denoted as Z (i) . In the following discussion, we always assume that X 6 = X because, when X = X , all Y (i) would equal the neutral element e of the group, which case is of no interest for di erential cryptanalysis.
Di erential cryptanalysis exploits the fact that the round function f in an iterated cipher is usually cryptographically weak. Thus, if the ciphertext pair is known and the di erence of the pair of inputs to the last round can somehow be obtained, then it is possible to determine (some substantial part of) the subkey of the last round. In di erential cryptanalysis, this is achieved by choosing plaintext pairs (X; X ) with a speci ed di erence such that the di erence Y (r ? 1) of the pair of inputs to the last round will take on a particular value with high probability. Based on this idea, we make the following de nition.
De nition. An i-round di erential is a couple ( ; ), where is the di erence of a pair of distinct plaintexts X and X and where is a possible di erence for the resulting i-th round outputs Y (i) and Y (i). The probability of an i-round di erential ( ; ) is the conditional probability that is the di erence Y (i) of the ciphertext pair after i rounds given that the plaintext pair (X; X ) has di erence X = when the plaintext X and the subkeys Z (1) ; :::; Z (i) are independent and uniformly random. We denote this di erential probability by P( Y (i) = j X = ).
The basic procedure of a di erential cryptanalysis attack on an r-round iterated cipher can be summarized as follows:
1) Find an (r-1)-round di erential ( ; ) such that P( Y (r ? 1) = j X = ) has maximum, or nearly maximum, probability.
2) Choose a plaintext X uniformly at random and compute X so that the di erence X between X and X is . Submit X and X for encryption under the actual key Z. From the resultant ciphertexts Y (r) and Y (r), nd every possible value (if any) of the subkey Z (r) of the last round corresponding to the anticipated di erence Y (r ?1) = . Add one to the count of the number of appearances of each such value of the subkey Z (r) .
3) Repeat 2) until one or more values of the subkey Z (r) are counted signi cantly more often than the others. Take this most-often-counted subkey, or this small set of such subkeys, as the cryptanalyst's decision for the actual subkey Z (r) .
Note that, in a di erential cryptanalysis attack, all the subkeys are xed and only the plaintext can be randomly chosen. In the computation of a di erential probability, however, the plaintext and all subkeys are independent and uniformly random. In preparing a di erential cryptanalysis attack, one uses the computed di erential probabilities to determine which di erential to use in the attack; hence, one is tacitly making the following hypothesis. Remark. In 1] , di erential cryptanalysis of DES was described in terms of \i-round characteristics". In our notation, an i-round characteristic as de ned in 1] is an (i+1)-tuple ( ; 1 ; :::; i ) considered as a possible value of ( X; Y (1); :::; Y (i)). Thus, a one-round characteristic coincides with a one-round di erential and an i-round characteristic determines a sequence of i di erentials, ( X; Y (j)) = ( ; j ): The probability of an i-round characteristic is de ned in 1] as P( Y (1) = 1 ; Y (2) = 2 ; ::; Y (i) = i j X = ) where the plaintext X and the subkeys Z (1) ; :::; Z (i) are independent and uniformly random. We use the notion of di erentials rather than characteristics because, in the di erential cryptanalysis of an r-round cipher, only the knowledge of Y (r?1) is required for determining the subkey Z (r) , no matter what the intermediate di erences Y (j); 1 j < r ? 1; may be. The most probable di erential will have in general a probability greater than that of the most probable characteristic ( although for DES with a small number of rounds, the two probabilities are roughly the same). Thus, by using di erential probabilities rather than characteristic probabilities, we consider in fact the true probability that di erential cryptanalysis will succeed, not just a lower bound on this probability. This is why we were able to derive a lower bound on the complexity of a di erential cryptanalysis attack from the probability of di erentials.
Markov Ciphers
In this section, a class of iterated ciphers that are especially interesting for di erential cryptanalysis will be considered. and . In what follows, we always assume that the plaintext X is independent of the subkeys Z (1) ; :::; Z (r) :]
De nition. An iterated cipher with round function Y = f(X; Z) is a Markov cipher if there is a group operation N for de ning di erences such that, for all choices of ( 6 = e) and ( 6 = e), P( Y = j X = ; X = )
is independent of when the subkey Z is uniformly random, or, equivalently, if
for all choices of when the subkey Z is uniformly random.
The following crucial theorem explains the terminology \Markov cipher".
Theorem 2 To show this, we note that
where the third equality comes from the fact that Y (1) and Y (1) together determine both Y (1) and Y (1) so that Y (2) has no further dependence on X when Y (1) and Y (1) are speci ed.
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Because the same round function is used in each round, this Markov chain is homogeneous. For any key Z = z, the round function f( ; z) is a bijective mapping from the set of plaintexts to the set of ciphertexts. This bijection induces a bijection from pairs of distinct plaintexts (X; X ) to pairs of distinct ciphertexts (Y; Y ) = (f(X; z); f(X ; z)). The fact that X and X(6 = e) are independent and uniformly distributed implies that (X; X ) is uniformly distributed over pairs of distinct plaintexts. Thus, (Y; Y ) is also uniformly distributed over pairs of distinct ciphertexts and hence Y (6 = e) is also uniformly distributed. Thus the uniform distribution is a stationary distribution for this Markov chain.
Example 1 For a Markov cipher with independent and uniformly random round subkeys, the probability of an r-round characteristic is given by the Chapman-Kolmogorov equation for a Markov chain as
It follows that the probability of an r-round di erential ( 0 ; r ) is
where the sums are over all possible values of di erences between distinct elements, i.e., over all group elements excepting the neutral element e. ij , equals P( Y (r) = j j X = i ), i.e., p (r) ij is just the probability of the r-round di erential ( i ; j ). The security of iterated cryptosystems is based on the belief that a cryptographically \strong" function can be obtained by iterating a cryptographically \weak" function enough times. For Markov ciphers, one has the following fact.
Theorem 3 For a Markov cipher of block length m with independent and uniformly random round subkeys, if the semi-in nite Markov chain X = Y (0); Y (1); ::: has a \steady-state probability" distribution, i.e., if there is a probability vector (p 1 ; p 2 ; ::; p M ), such that, for all i ; lim r!1 P( Y (r) = j j X = i ) = p j ; then this steady state distribution must be the uniform distribution (1=M; 1=M; :::; 1=M), i.e., lim r!1 P( Y (r) = j X = ) = 1 2 m ?1 for every di erential ( ; ), so that every di erential will be roughly equally likely after su ciently many rounds. If we assume additionally that the hypothesis of stochastic equivalence holds for this Markov cipher, then, for almost all subkeys, this cipher is secure against a di erential cryptanalysis attack after su ciently many rounds.
Proof. The theorem follows from the facts that the existence of a steady-state probability distribution implies that a homogeneous Markov chain has a unique stationary distribution, which is the steady-state distribution, and that, according to Theorem 2, the uniform distribution is a stationary distribution.
Analysis of the block cipher PES
The block cipher PES, proposed by Lai ), denoted as J . The encryption process of PES is shown in Fig.2 . In order to consider di erential cryptanalysis of PES, we must rst de ne \di erence".
The encryption of a plaintext pair by an r-round PES can be described as shown in Fig. 3 , where X i and Z ? ? (  (  (  (  (  (  (  (  (  (  (  (  (  (  (  (  (  (  (   (  (  (  (  (  (  (  (  (  (  (  (  (  (  (  (  (  (  (  ?  ?  ? ? The regular structure of PES makes it possible, and insightful, to consider \mini" PES ciphers with shorter block length. A mini PES has the same computational graph as the standard PES shown in Fig.2 , but the subblocks are only n bits long (n=2, 4 or 8) rather than 16, and the operations L ; + and J are then the corresponding bitwise XOR, addition modulo 2 n , and multiplication modulo 2 n + 1. Note that for n=2, 4 and 8, these three operations are still group operations. Thus, the resulting mini PES is a Markov cipher with block length 4n, by the same argument as for PES(64).
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We have been able to prove that, for PES(8) and PES(16), the uniform distribution is indeed the steady-state probability of the sequence of di erences. Thus, PES(8) and PES(16) with su ciently many rounds are guaranteed secure against di erential cryptanalysis. We conjecture that PES(32) and PES(64) also have the uniform distribution as the steady-state probability distribution for their sequences of di erences.
In order to nd the one-round di erential with highest probability, an exhaustive search was performed for the mini ciphers PES(8) and PES(16). The most likely one-round di erentials ( X; Y (1)) for PES(8) and PES(16) are: Y (1) = X = ( X 1 ; X 2 ; X 3 ; X 4 ) = (0; 1; odd; 0); odd 2 f1; 3; ::; 2 n ? 1g; and each has a probability approximately 2 ?(2n?2) . The i-round di erentials ( X; Y (i)) that take on these same values also have the greatest probabilities for small i > 1. The probabilities of the above i-round di erentials for PES(8) and PES(16) are shown in Table 1 which is a lower bound on, and a plausibly good approximation to, the probabilities of the 7-round di erential ( i ; j ). One sees that the di erential ( 1 ; 2 ) has probability about 1:22 2 ?58 and appears to be the largest 7-round di erential probability. Our lower bound on the complexity of di erential cryptanalysis shows then that at least 2 59 encryptions will be required. The detailed cryptanalysis given in the Appendix shows that in fact the di erential cryptanalysis attack will require all 2 64 possible encryptions.
Improved PES
PES can be modi ed to improve its security without violating the design principles 2] used for PES. The resulting modi ed cipher will be called Improved PES and denoted as IPES. The only essential modi cation is that a di erent (and simpler) permutation of subblocks is used at the end of each of the rst 7 rounds. The software implementation of IPES is in fact more e cient than that of PES.
The computational graph of the encryption process of IPES is shown in Fig.4 . Note that the permutation before the output transformation \undoes" the permutation at the end of 8-th round, i.e., at the end of 8-th round, the subblocks are not in fact permuted.
The key schedule used to generate the encryption key subblocks for IPES is the same as for PES (see 2]).
The decryption key DK for IPES is computed from the encryption key Z as follows, for r = 2; ::; 8 : (DK ? ? (  (  (  (  (  (  (  (  (  (  (  (  (  ?  ?   J 
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Because of the involution property of the round function for PES, the transition probability matrix of round di erentials of PES is symmetric. Thus, the one-round di erentials (A,B) and (B,A) will have the same probability P(BjA). For a highly likely one-round di erential (A,B) , the probability of a 2i-round di erential (A,A) can thus be approximated by the probability of the corresponding 2i-round characteristics (A; B; A; B; :::; A; B; A), i.e., P 2i (AjA) P(BjA)]
2i
. Similarly, the probability of the 2i+1 round di erential (A,B) can be approximated by P 2i+1 (BjA) P(BjA)] 2i+1 . For example, the probability of the plausibly most probable one-round di erential for PES is P( Y (1) = (0; 0; 0; 1)j X = (0; 0; 0; ?1)) 2 ?9 , ?1 stands for the integer 2 16 ? 1,] the corresponding 7-round characteristics has probability about 2 ?61 . This suggests that ( X = (0; 0; 0; ?1); Y (7) = (0; 0; 0; 1)) is the most likely 7-round di erential. The analysis given in Appendix shows that it is indeed the (plausibly) most likely 7-round di erential with probability about 2 ?58 , which is quite close to the probability of the corresponding characteristic.
The previous discussion suggests the following design principle for a Markov cipher: The transition probability matrix of a Markov cipher should not be symmetric. Otherwise, the concatenation of the most probable one-round di erential with itself r-1 times will tend to provide an (r-1)-round di erential with high probability. The change of the permutation of subblocks between rounds of PES that is used in IPES is in accordance with this new design principle, i.e., the transition probability matrix of IPES is not symmetric. The change also signi cantly reduces the probabilities of the highly likely one-round di erentials. For IPES, the (plausibly) most probable 1-round di erential has probability P( Y (1) 
However, IPES is not a Markov cipher for this notion of di erence. If DX is used as the de nition of di erence, the hypothesis of stochastic equivalence does not hold at all for IPES so that the di erential probabilities computed for this notion of di erence have no relation to an attack by di erential cryptanalysis. The fact that the 3-round di erential (DX = (0; H; H; 0); DY (3) = (0; H; H; 0)) for the di erence DX has probability much larger than 3-round di erentials for the \appropriate" di erence X used above has thus no signi cance for di erential cryptanalysis.
Appendix: Detailed Di erential Cryptanalysis of PES 1. Some One Round Di erentials for PES We rst calculate the probabilities of certain one-round di erentials for PES for pairs of input blocks that di er by a given value. This will enable us to calculate the probability of a 7 1 2 -round di erential from which it is usually possible to nd the sub-key used in the last round.
Clearly a 16-bit number is its own inverse under the group operation . Let ?z denote the inverse of z under t u + , and z ?1 the inverse of z under . For any n-bit number z, let z 0 denote the n-bit complement of z. We also introduce some notation for the di erence of two 16-bit numbers z 1 ; z 2 under the group operations and t u + . Let denote the di erence under and @ denote the di erence under t u + , i.e., (  (  (  (  (  (  (  (  (  (  (  (  (  (  (  (  (  (  (   (  (  (  (  (  (  (  (  (  (  (  (  (  (  (  (  (  (  (  ?  ?  ? ? In order to nd a di erential with high probability, we need to nd such (u 1 ; u 2 ) with y = 0 and @w 2 S, where y i = h i u i ; w i = f i u i : We can now make a similar statement to the one above for the other half of the cipher. Given p 1 + p 2 = 1 (mod 2 16 ); ( b; @d) = (0; n 1 ) ) ( y; @w) = (0; n 2 ) for n 1 ; n 2 2 S with probability given by the appropriate entry of T b;d :
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We can now calculate some approximate 1-round di erential probabilities for PES. These are given by the transition matrix T a;b;c;d = We can now calculate a 7-round transition matrix, whose entries give the probability that, given that the input pair to the rst round di er by a given value, then the ouput di erences of the seventh round and the input di erences to all the intermediate rounds are all of the required form. We denote this matrix by T7 a;b;c;d . It is easily calculated since 
